Iraq

I was horrified in the summer of 2002 when I first began to hear the Bush administration and Joe Lieberman talk about the need to invade Iraq. I spoke forcefully to anyone who would listen that it would be the worst foreign policy decision in my adult lifetime. Before the invasion I wrote extensively to friends that I believed:

-It would cost $100 to $200 billion dollars. We have exceeded those numbers. Prior to invasion, the Bush administration predicted a maximum cost of $25 billion.

-Saddam Hussein and Iraq presented NO imminent danger to the United States. Even if he had WMD programs, they had been severely damaged and most likely discontinued as a result of U.N. inspections. In fact, that was one good result of the pressure that the Bush administration had brought to bear: for the first time in over five years, and possibly ever, U.N. inspectors had been granted unfettered access throughout Iraq. I felt it was possible and likely that Saddam still had a chemical weapons program, and perhaps a fledgling biological program, but I was convinced from U.N. reports that there was no active nuclear weapons program. There certainly was no imminent danger or need to rush to war.

-We had Saddam bottled up with no fly zones in the north and south, and with U.N. weapons inspections. His power within his own country had shrunk considerably, and the abuse of his own people was at an all-time low.

-Saddam and Iraq had no significant link to Al Qaeda, and in fact Saddam hated Osama bin Laden. Yes, Saddam was an evil, ruthless dictator, but he actually opposed bin Laden’s philosophies.

-Invading Iraq would increase terrorism. It would be a recruiting tool for Al Qaeda, and in fact was exactly what bin Laden wanted us to do.

-There was a real risk of significant U.S. casualties. Many of my friends thought I was crazy when I said it was possible that we might have 1,000 casualties over the long haul. Tragically, we have far exceeded this.

-We had no exit strategy. Even President Bush’s father said this!

-There was a significant risk that civil war would develop and the country would become another Lebanon.

-I was also concerned that the Kurds in the north would declare autonomy, and Turkey would invade the northern part of Iraq.

Only the last item has not happened. I wish I’d been all wrong, and everything had gone the way the Bush administration said it would. But I don’t understand how any intelligent human could look at the evidence that was available and not reach the above conclusions. Neither the Bush administration nor Joe Lieberman engaged in objective risk analysis, nor developed contingency plans in case things didn’t go exactly as they hoped. I don’t know how George Bush, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and the other architects of the war can sleep at night. They failed us by deciding foreign policy with blinders on. This has been the pattern of this administration with every foreign and domestic issue: they make up their minds that they know what will happen, and then are completely unprepared when things go differently. (Another horrible example: Katrina.) We need government that exercises intelligent, competent planning, with quantitative risk and benefit/cost analyses, and with contingency planning. I will fight for this!

WHAT DO WE DO NOW IN IRAQ?

I would have voted for the Levin-Reed Amendment that was defeated in the Senate on June 22, 2006. Joe Lieberman voted against it. I would not have voted for the Kerry-Feingold amendment calling for immediate withdrawal. It’s too soon to set a firm timetable. However, we can still make some changes that can help speed up our ability to withdraw troops:

I’ve argued all along that the best way to handover security to Iraqi forces in Iraq would be to transport Iraqi police and military volunteers out of Iraq and train them outside the country, where there is no fear of violence, and they do nothing but train. It’s also important to create integrated units, with Shia and Sunni working side-by-side in the same units. It would be the best way to break down prejudice and hatred, and to develop units that can truly operate in a competent and independent way. They need to go through a real military basic training, in which they develop a loyalty to the unit. It’s a shame that this program was not instituted in the beginning, but I don’t think it’s too late to try it. We’re still a long ways from Iraq having an adequate Iraqi security force. I feel so badly for our troops and their families. We need to do everything possible to bring them home. It’s also important to do everything we can to give Iraq a chance to be a stable country. It’s too soon to set a firm timetable for withdrawal.